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Article
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Abstract
The framing of issues is part of the tool kit used by lobbyists in modern 
policy making, yet the ways in which framing works to affect lobbying success 
across issues remain underexplored. Analyzing a new dataset of lobbying in 
the news on 50 policy issues in five European countries, we demonstrate 
that it is not individual but collective framing that matters: Emphasis frames 
that enjoy collective backing from lobbying camps of like-minded advocates 
affect an advocate’s success, rather than frames being voiced by individual 
advocates. Crucially, it matters for advocacy success whether the advocate’s 
camp frames its policy goals on an issue in unity with “one voice” and 
whether the actor’s camp wins the contest of framing the issue vis-à-vis the 
opposing camp. Our results emphasize the need to consider the collective 
mechanisms behind the power of framing and have implications for future 
research on framing as an advocacy tool.
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The framing of an issue is one potential pathway of understanding the out-
comes of policy negotiations. Is the issue of nuclear power, for instance, 
essentially a matter of environmental benefits in contrast to coal, or a security 
issue due to the threat of accidents or even terror attacks? One might argue 
that how such emphasis frames (Entman, 1993, p. 53; Goffman, 1974, p. 21) 
come to dominate the debate in a country is a crucial explanatory factor in 
understanding why some countries are phasing out nuclear power while oth-
ers are not. Advocates1 who try to convince policy makers of a preferred 
policy outcome on an issue would surely like to tap into this potential power 
of frames. In fact, framing can today be considered an important lobbying 
tool and the ability to frame an issue by defining the problem at stake may act 
“as a weapon of advocacy” (Weiss, 1989, p. 117). Not surprisingly, the phe-
nomenon of framing by nonstate actors has therefore attracted a large litera-
ture of in-depth qualitative studies (e.g., Baumgartner, De Boef, & Boydstun, 
2008; Daviter, 2011; Dudley & Richardson, 1999; Sell & Prakash, 2004; 
Voltolini, 2016; Weiss, 1989) and also recently received greater attention 
from quantitative lobbying scholars (Boräng & Naurin, 2015; Dür, 2016; 
Eising, Rasch, & Rozbicka, 2015; Klüver & Mahoney, 2015; Klüver, 
Mahoney, & Opper, 2015). Still, the potential effects of framing have so far 
mainly been traced in studies of single or few issues, which tease out the 
complex processes of issue definition. Quantitative studies have largely 
failed to pick up these processes to show if and how framing matters for 
policy outcomes across issues and countries. Such an analysis is important to 
probe if there are generalizable patterns in whether and how framing plays a 
role in helping certain interests win out in the struggle over policy outcomes. 
The two main large-n analyses of frames in policy debates, namely 
Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech (2009) and Mahoney 
(2008), stress that actors find it difficult to (re-)frame issues, because existing 
collective frames are hard to change. This article argues that the contrast 
between individual frames and collective framing, which emerges from the 
mix and contest of frames at a point in time (Baumgartner & Mahoney, 2008), 
is crucial for understanding and quantitatively tracing the effects of framing, 
but has, so far, hardly been bridged by theory and empirical testing.
This article connects the literatures on individual framing and collective 
issue definition by shedding light on framing by lobbying camps of advo-
cates promoting the same policy outcome in the media. We add to the the-
ory on framing that the camp level is crucial for understanding the 
competitive forces at play in trying to frame an issue and sway policy mak-
ers. Our expectation is that frames used by individual actors are unlikely to 
affect their preference attainment, but that the frames used by an actor’s 
positional camp are more likely to matter. The reason is that, while 
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individual frames are unlikely to reach and affect policy makers, those 
frames that get voiced by a positional camp are likely to be the ones that 
policy makers will perceive to be connected with this policy position. 
Furthermore, we address the question of how camp frames work to affect 
lobbying success. We hypothesize that to impact the public debate and 
reach policy makers with a frame, it is crucial to what extent a camp of like-
minded advocates speaks in unity with one voice, meaning how consis-
tently the issue is framed by a camp, as well as how frequently the camp 
promotes its dominant frame on the issue. Finally, we hypothesize that it 
matters for an advocate’s likelihood to succeed whether the frame most 
strongly promoted by her camp also comes to dominate the debate at the 
issue level vis-a-vis the framing by the opposing camp.
To analyze these relationships, a new dataset on framing by advocates in 
mainstream news media on a sample of 50 policy issues in five European 
countries (Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) was generated. While the mechanisms we address may have more 
general applicability to many types of frames (cf. De Bruycker, 2017), we 
focus on emphasis frames in terms of “what is at stake in an issue” (Daviter, 
2011, p. 2) according to the advocates. Newspaper articles on the 50 issues 
were coded to capture whether actors refer to substantive priorities of policy 
making, such as Safety, Rights, Economy, or the Environment, when advo-
cating their preferred policy position. Based on existing framing research, we 
argue that problem-definition in terms of the trade-offs between such politi-
cal goods at stake is at heart of understanding policy conflicts and prioritiza-
tion of interests across policies.
Our results suggest, first, that success through such emphasis framing is 
largely the result of a collective process at the camp level rather than of fram-
ing efforts by individual advocates. Whereas the use of individual emphasis 
framing has no significant association with preference attainment of the actor 
voicing the frame, framing activities by like-minded actors affect the success 
of the individual advocate. In the case of the emphasis frames assessed in this 
article, the effect is positive: Individual actors benefit when their camps pro-
mote emphasis framing of the issue in the media arena. Yet, the positive effect 
of camp framing depends on how much the actor’s camp frames the issue in 
unity, so advocates in camps that frame more consistently can benefit from 
higher preference attainment. In contrast, the mere frequency of how often 
the camp promotes its main frame on the issue is not beneficial. It seems, 
therefore, that frame consensus, rather than mere framing volume, is impor-
tant when it comes to collective framing. In addition, we show how camp-
level contest of frames relates to the issue level: Where the emphasis frame 
promoted most often by an actor’s camp also comes to dominate the issue 
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debate of all advocates voicing competing positions, this increases an advo-
cate’s predicted chance of success.
These results on the effects of collective framing are relevant beyond the 
study of lobbying: Knowledge about how frames relate to advocacy success 
helps shed light on how certain arguments win the political struggle about 
“who gets what, when, how” (Lasswell, 1950). Specifically, our analysis 
makes tangible how framing in the news media is essentially a team sport, 
where the success of individual advocates is dependent on aligning consistent 
framing strategies with other like-minded actors and successfully positioning 
these vis-à-vis the opposing camp. Insights into these dynamics are relevant 
for advocates wanting to improve their communication strategies, as well as 
for scholars and citizens wishing to understand how the alignment of political 
arguments on an issue is related to political decisions.
From Individual to Issue: Camp-Level Framing as 
the Missing Link
In making some understandings of an issue more salient than others, frames 
can play crucial roles in problem-definition and solution-finding (Entman, 
1993, p. 52; Goffman, 1974). As has been shown in qualitative studies, 
frames voiced in a political debate can be consequential, because “problem 
definition exerts power in the policy process” (Weiss, 1989, p. 99), ultimately 
affecting who gets their way in terms of policy outcomes (Daviter, 2011). 
Framing can herein be seen both from a constructivist vantage point, in terms 
of how meanings arise through interactive processes, which determine the 
understanding of problems and hence shape the choice of policy solutions 
(Braun, 1999; Snow, 2004), and from a more rationalist view of framing as a 
strategic process that attempts to utilize cognitive or organizational biases to 
manipulate policy outcomes (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Riker, 1986; 
Schattschneider, 1960). Either way, the verdict of qualitative studies is that 
frames have the ability to affect how policy makers grasp and process com-
plex policy choices and hence work in favor of certain interests over others. 
As Daviter (2011) shows in his study of European Union (EU) biotechnology 
policy, the emphasis framing of an issue will affect who policy makers con-
sult and listen to. Similarly, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have argued that 
policy framing affects how decision makers process and simplify the multiple 
dimensions of complex policy issues, thus biasing what types of information 
and interests are included. If, for instance, policy makers come to understand 
an issue, as an environmental rather than as an economic problem, this will 
affect who they consult and listen to and, thus, influence who gets their way 
in the resulting policy outcomes. Yet, one can ask the following: How do 
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these dynamics of framing work when it comes to affecting the lobbying suc-
cess of individual advocates?
The latest quantitative studies on framing in the lobbying literature only 
begin to assess this. Some of the new research is dedicated to understanding 
the choice of frames (Eising et al., 2015; Klüver et al., 2015), which is shown 
to vary systematically across actor type and institutional venues. Regarding 
effects of frames, Dür (2016) shows that the issue frames used by groups 
have the potential to shape public opinion, but it remains to be shown if and 
how frames also relate to policy outcomes and preference attainment. Boräng 
and Naurin (2015) show that civil society groups are more likely than busi-
ness to share frames with EU Commission officials. While one may assume 
that sharing the same frame makes a common policy position more likely, it 
is paramount to also test the relationship between frames and advocacy suc-
cess directly. Klüver and Mahoney (2015) focus on the success of frames in 
shaping the outcome of legislative debates, but their contribution lies in test-
ing a new computerized method to measure framing success. Overall, the 
latest quantitative literature on framing in politics is still far from being able 
to explain how frames and advocacy success are related. And importantly, it 
solely focuses on individual frames, whereas qualitative studies emphasize 
the importance of collective issue definition for determining how policy mak-
ers conceive of, and decide on, policy issues (e.g., Baumgartner et al., 2008; 
Daviter, 2011; Dudley & Richardson, 1999; Weiss, 1989). Both more theory 
and more empirical testing are needed to spell out how individual frames 
voiced by advocates come together and play out to their advantage or disad-
vantage. Such an approach can make a contribution relevant even outside the 
discipline of political science. As Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar (2016) 
recently attested, “the field of communication produces dozens of framing 
studies each year,” yet would benefit from “an overall refocusing on the con-
cept, one that examines framing in terms of its original theoretical founda-
tions and proposed mechanisms” (p. 9).
Camp-Level Frames
The theory put forth in this article holds that framing is crucially a collective 
process, but with effective consequences for individual advocates, depending 
on how individual frames on an issue come together. Baumgartner and 
Mahoney (2008) lay the foundation for this theory by connecting the litera-
ture on framing by individual advocates with the literature on issue definition 
(e.g., Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Riker, Calvert, Mueller, & Wilson, 1996; 
Ringe, 2005). They distinguish “two faces of framing,” namely the individual 
framing of an issue by an actor and collective framing, which emerges from 
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the mix and contest of frames at a point in time. Their article calls for large 
empirical projects to assess the interactions between individual and collective 
framing. So far, however, much of the connective tissue in terms of theory 
linking these two levels remains thin and only implicit. As Baumgartner and 
Mahoney (2008) argue, the “key insight here is that in a social network, […] 
collective actions are principally determined by the communications net-
works among the whole, more than by the preferences of any single actor” (p. 
443). We argue in this article that the missing link in the evolving theory on 
framing is the camp level of like-minded advocates promoting the same pol-
icy outcome, which connect individual strategies to outcomes.
Advocacy camps pit the opposing sides on an issue against each other and 
try to pull policy makers in their preferred policy direction. Previous studies of 
lobbying success have shown that the strength of the camp in terms of num-
bers of actors or aggregate resources affect the likelihood of success for single 
actors in the camp (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Klüver, 2013; Mahoney & 
Baumgartner, 2015). As Klüver (2013) argues, lobbying “is not an individual 
endeavor, but a complex collective process involving multiple interest groups 
that are simultaneously trying to shift the policy outcome towards their ideal 
point” (p. 64). The same, we argue, holds for framing processes: not just num-
bers of actors in a camp but the arguments they collectively put forth for their 
desired policy outcome are expected to affect how appealing their goal is to 
policy makers. Importantly, this is not a process that any one actor controls 
and it is not necessarily coordinated at all. The assumption is that there is 
interdependence, or a community of fate, between all advocates promoting the 
same policy outcome, because the appeal of their position to policy makers is 
affected by how all their voices come together to characterize the alternative 
outcomes on the issue. Therefore, we argue that frames voiced by individual 
advocates are only very indirectly linked to how a policy position is perceived 
in the public and by decision makers, and that their effect only plays out in 
how frames voiced by the camp promoting the same position come together. 
As a consequence, individual frames are unlikely to exert an effect on lobby-
ing success (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Mahoney, 2008). In contrast, we expect 
the set of frames voiced by a positional camp of advocates to impact the public 
discussion and perception of policy options, hence potentially shaping how 
decision makers process information, who they consult, and, ultimately, how 
they decide on an issue (cf. Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Daviter, 2011). For 
this reason, we expect that camp-level framing affects the likelihood of prefer-
ence attainment for a single advocate in the camp.
While our reasoning could be applied to many different types of frames 
(see, for an overview, De Bruycker, 2017), we focus on the effects of empha-
sis frames that attach a specific positively connoted policy priority or 
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“political good” to the policy position. This begins from an understanding of 
emphasis frames as verbal attempts by advocates to define “what is at stake 
in an issue” (Daviter, 2011, p. 2). Such an understanding goes beyond the 
mere policy area of the issue, because it specifies what, according to the 
actor, is important to foster or protect, thus placing value to certain aspects of 
human activity. Most issues can be treated from several such normative van-
tage points which is why emphasis framing is applicable across policy issues 
and areas and, thus, suited for comparison across a large number of diverse 
issues. The issue of whether amnesty should be granted to immigrants who 
have illegally entered the country can, for instance, be treated emphasizing a 
rights perspective, stressing the rights and grievances of those who have fled 
war or persecution. Alternatively, emphasis can be placed on the (positive or 
negative) effects that legalizing immigrants has on the economy in terms of 
unemployment or economic growth. Others may emphasize security con-
cerns connected to flows of migrants or their illegal status, while even others 
might stress effects on national culture. Given such emphasis framing stresses 
different but politically similarly important ends to cultivate, we expect these 
frames to be positively related to preference attainment when they come to be 
publicly associated with a policy position, compared with when there is no 
emphasis framing of the priority at stake. Yet, whereas such an effect is 
unlikely to be achieved by individually voiced emphasis frames, ideas pro-
moted by a camp have the potential to be associated with how potential pol-
icy change is perceived and thereby to be more likely to affect public 
perceptions and, ultimately, decision makers. This results in the following 
first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The emphasis frames used by the positional camp of an 
advocate are more likely to increase that advocate’s likelihood of preference 
attainment than the individual emphasis frames used by the advocate.
Frame Dominance and Competition Between Camps
In addition to arguing that camp framing matters for advocacy success, it is 
highly valuable to quantitatively assess hypotheses on how it does so. We 
assess three related potential ways linked to how dominant camp frames, 
meaning the frames voiced most prominently by an actor’s camp, are pro-
moted and compete with those of the opposing camp. At heart of these mech-
anisms lies the argument that it is important that a frame, meaning in our case 
the political priority emphasized, is cognitively connected to a specific policy 
position in the public arena and perception of policy makers. This association 
should be affected by the frame that is most often promoted by a positional 
camp, which we call the dominant camp frame.
490 Comparative Political Studies 52(4)
First, we argue that the unity with which the camp promotes its dominant 
frame should affect how likely it is to reach policy makers with the “mes-
sage” of the dominant policy priority at stake. We argue that framing with one 
voice as a camp, meaning using consistent emphasis framing, should be con-
ducive to sending a strong message. Indeed, Nelson and Yackee (2012) have 
shown that it matters for the success of advocates in active lobbying coali-
tions whether they send a signal of consensus on the coalition’s message. 
Similarly, frame consensus within a camp may increase effectiveness of 
reaching and convincing policy makers of a preferred outcome.
Second, one can argue that the frequency with which the dominant frame 
is used should increase the chances of successfully associating a political 
good with the preferred policy outcome. Both from a constructivist percep-
tive of shaping meaning through social interactions and from a more rational-
ist view of framing as a strategic process of biasing or convincing decision 
makers, the level of exposure to the dominant frame can be expected to mat-
ter for reaching relevant audiences including the general public and policy 
makers. Advocates in a camp should benefit more, the more often their most 
frequently used camp frame is spread. The stronger the presence of their 
dominant frame, the higher should be the likelihood to affect public and pol-
icy makers’ perceptions with it. Therefore, we expect a higher frequency of 
use of the dominant camp frame to increase the likelihood of success for 
advocates in that camp.
Third and crucially, we argue that for the dominant camp frame to be most 
likely to positively affect public and political perceptions, it matters whether 
the dominant frame promoted by the camp level also comes to dominate the 
issue in relation to the dominant frame of the competing camp. As Dudley 
and Richardson (1999) show for the case of EU steel policy, competing advo-
cacy coalitions try to impose their frames on the policy discourse on the issue 
in general. They show how, over time, the balance of power in EU steel pol-
icy shifts as a free market frame becomes the dominant policy frame on the 
issue. In this way, issue definition (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Riker et al., 
1996; Ringe, 2005; Weiss, 1989) can be seen as a contest between the frames 
of opposing advocacy camps. Boräng and Naurin (2015) use the concept of 
“frame congruence” to denote whether (different actor types of) lobbyists 
voice the same frames as EU Commission officials. We argue that when we 
are interested in the mechanism of how publics and policy makers pick up 
and are affected by frames voiced by lobbyists, a collective notion of frame 
congruence at the issue level is relevant. If an actor’s camp wins this battle of 
framing the issue in the media in contrast to the other camp, we expect policy 
makers to be more likely to be reached and affected by the emphasis frame, 
so preference attainment should be more likely for actors in that camp. Put 
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differently, succeeding in seeing policy goals realized should be increased, if 
the safeguarding of the substantive priority, for instance, the environment, the 
economy, or safety, that is associated with a policy position has come to dom-
inate how the general issue is discussed by advocates in the media. Whether 
this is a conscious process of being convinced by the help of the issue frame, 
or a subconscious process of associating certain policy priorities more 
strongly with the issue, is not possible to distinguish. Yet, irrespective of this, 
we argue that the congruence between dominant camp and issue frames sug-
gests how successful the camp was in positioning its substantive priority as 
most prevalent on the issue. So, whenever the opposing camps voice different 
dominant frames, we predict a higher likelihood of success for actors in the 
camp whose frame of what is at stake dominates the debate at the issue level. 
In contrast, where the two camps voice the same dominant frame, we do not 
expect an effect as none of the two sides enjoy a comparative advantage from 
having won the battle of framing at the issue level.
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 summarize these expectations on frame consensus, 
frequency of use of the dominant frame, and camp-issue frame congruence, 
as three ways in which the emphasis framing by a camp affects issue percep-
tions and, ultimately, policy decisions and lobbying success.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The more unity there is in the use of emphasis frames 
by an advocate’s camp, the higher the likelihood of preference attainment 
for the advocate.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The more frequently the dominant emphasis frame is 
used by an advocate’s camp, the higher the likelihood of preference attain-
ment for the advocate.
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Congruence between the emphasis frame used domi-
nantly by an advocate’s camp and the dominant emphasis frame at issue 
level increases the advocate’s likelihood of preference attainment.
To sum up, Figure 1 illustrates the hypothesized relationships. It shows that 
individual frames voiced by advocates when promoting a policy position are 
only distantly related to how policy change and status quo are publicly per-
ceived, which sets the context for how policy makers weigh up the trade-offs 
between different political outcomes, and ultimately decide. So, we argue 
that individual frames only have an indirect effect that is strongly moderated 
through how frames voiced by the camp of an advocates come together and 
compete with the opposing camp. As Figure 1 shows, the Dominant Frame 
at camp level results from the individual frames voiced by actors in the lob-
bying camp, depending on which emphasis frame (A-D) is voiced most 
often. Its effect on public perceptions are hypothesized to work through (a) 
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the unity of camp framing, (b) the frequency of use of the dominant camp 
frame, and (c) congruence between the dominant frames at the camp and 
issue level. Where the dominant frame promoted by an advocate’s camp is 
promoted more homogenously, more frequently and more competitively in 
relation to the other camp, all advocates in the camp should benefit from a 
higher likelihood that their collective emphasis frame is favorably taken into 
account by policy makers and have a higher likelihood of preference 
attainment.
Research Design
Unfortunately, experimental designs that have been used to assess the effects 
of frames on citizens (most famously Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) cannot 
feasibly be applied to assess the effect of camp-level framing, because such 
collective frames develop from the mix of all existing narratives that compete 
for attention in the public domain. These cannot be randomly assigned and 
presented to policy makers in a controlled manner. Therefore, we focus on 
the correlation between framing and advocacy success across a large number 
of quasi-randomly selected issues on the public agenda. While frames will be 
voiced and exchanged through many channels, including in hearings, consul-
tations, and face-to-face discussions, we herein focus on frames that are 
Figure 1. Illustration of camp framing relationships.
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voiced by advocates in mainstream media, as a reflection of public debates to 
which policy makers are exposed. As De Bruycker (2017, p. 6) stresses, the 
news media is a good, but so far relatively neglected, venue to study collec-
tive advocacy frames. Importantly, we acknowledge that frames reported in 
mainstream newspapers are subject to a bias, because journalists and editors 
get to choose who and what they quote (Bennett, 1990). Yet, our reasoning is 
that this filtering is part of how collective framing works. Those positions and 
frames that make it into the mainstream media are likely to be the ones that 
crucially shape the characterization of an issue and of the competing posi-
tions on it. Policy makers are exposed to these frames in mainstream media 
and may be expected to take them as an indication of positions and arguments 
on a policy issue. While it would be ideal to assess and compare if the frames 
voiced in the mainstream media are consistent with how advocates frame 
issues in other interactions with policy makers, this goes beyond the scope of 
this article.
To capture and analyze frames at the individual, camp, and issue level, 
we opted for a coding of direct quotes by advocates in newspaper articles 
on a sample of 50 specific policy issues. Ten issues per country were 
selected as a stratified quasi-random sample in Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries include 
variation in interest group systems, namely corporatist and pluralist 
(Schmitter, 1977), and worlds of welfare, namely liberal, conservative, and 
social democratic (Esping-Andersen, 1990), which may affect the appeal of 
emphasis frames used.
Sampling of Issues
The sample of policy issues started from the universe of national policy 
issues on which public opinion surveys were conducted in the timeframe 
between 2005 and 2010 and which measured the degree of public support for 
adopting specific policy changes to the status quo. This sampling is prefera-
ble to sampling only issues that are on the legislative agenda, because it 
means that the resulting sample of issues can vary in terms of the level of 
legislative action and phase in the policy cycle. Surely it can be argued that 
issues for which no public opinion polls exist will differ systematically from 
issues on which such data exist. For instance, an issue probably needs a mini-
mum level of salience at one point in time for pollsters to ask about it. Yet, 
given that a similar threshold of salience is required for mainstream media to 
write about an issue (and cite different actors, their positions, and their 
frames), it is appropriate for this study to select issues from the universe of 
issues that are on the public (pollster) agenda, and assess how collective 
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frames voiced in the media affect preference attainment of active actors. The 
stratified quasi-random sample of issues from public opinion polls was 
selected in a way to vary the media salience of the issues measured by con-
ducting a keyword search in a major national newspaper for each issue.2 
Furthermore, the selection of issues includes variation in policy type (regula-
tory, distributive, and redistributive) and the level of public support for policy 
change, as these issue dimensions may affect advocacy success. Stratifying 
the sample in this way ensures that findings generated are not just limited to 
certain types of issue structures such as salient, regulatory, or distributive 
issues. A list of all sampled issues can be found in Online Appendix A.
Dependent Variable: Success as Preference Attainment of the 
Individual Actor
Advocacy success of an actor is understood in terms of preference attain-
ment, that is, a binary variable noting whether the (lack of) policy change on 
an issue was in line with the position voiced by that advocate (Rasmussen, 
Mäder, & Reher, 2018). To identify the sample of actors and whether they 
supported or opposed policy change on the 50 policy issues, media coverage 
on each issue was coded by human coders. This strategy cannot necessarily 
be assumed to identify all actors active on the issue in all venues, but it is 
sufficient to assess the relationship of frames in the media and advocacy 
success.
Two media sources per country (center-left, center-right3) were coded for 
a timeframe of up to 4 years after the public opinion item was asked. Where 
a policy change occurred earlier, this ended the observation period. The code-
book used by the coders to identify actors and code positions, can be accessed 
online.4 The coding was conservative in that only statements containing a 
position on the exact policy item were coded, while neutral or unclear state-
ments were excluded from the analysis.
These data at the statement level were then aggregated to the level of an 
advocate within a policy issue, for which n = 604. For each of these units of 
analysis, a measure of preference attainment was created that relates the 
advocate’s position to the policy outcome on an issue at the end of our obser-
vation period described above; 1 denotes preference attainment in cases 
where an advocate supported policy change that was implemented, or 
opposed a change that did not take place, whereas 0 refers to a scenario in 
which the final policy outcome runs counter to the actor’s voiced preference. 
The policy outcomes on all issues were gathered by desk research and cross-
validated by interviews with policy makers (on 82% of the issues).
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Independent Variables
Our key independent variables measure frames used by advocates. To make 
our hypotheses on the workings of camp framing testable, our focus lies 
solely on generic emphasis frames, which are applicable across policy issues 
and areas and, thus, suited for comparison across a large number of diverse 
issues. The five different substantive frames included in our research are as 
follows: Safety (including security concerns and health risks), Rights, 
Economy, Environment, and Culture. These were selected based on catego-
ries in existing research (Klüver et al., 2015) to capture distinct understand-
ings of what should be the major concern regarding a policy. These five 
categories proved to be applicable across the diverse issues with such empha-
sis frame present on 44 out of 50 issues at issue level.5
Importantly, when coding the five frames in the newspaper articles, only 
direct quotations by actors were coded, to avoid that a frame was intro-
duced by the journalist rather than the actor itself. The five frames were 
coded as mutually exclusive, in that for each quote by an actor, where posi-
tion and attached frames were identified, at most one frame could be cho-
sen, namely the one that is mentioned first by the speaker, unless there is 
clear priority verbally attached to a subsequent one. Frames were coded by 
four human coders in all articles that contained at least one position on an 
issue by an actor.
A detailed codebook6 including signaling words for each frame, as well as 
an interactive Google Docs file, where coders entered additional signaling 
words and other coding decisions facilitated intercoder reliability. For illus-
trative purposes, Online Appendix B provides examples of quotes from the 
U.K. sample, the respective coding, and the signaling words used. An inter-
coder reliability test was performed on a sample of 30 quotes from the U.K. 
material.7 Krippendorff’s α (four raters, 30 units) lies at α = .78 for the 
detailed coding in terms of a categorical framing variable at the quote level, 
taking 0 (no frame) or 1 of five values (Safety, Rights, Economy, Environment, 
and Culture). This value lends confidence in the data generating process, 
because it is very high in the spectrum of acceptable agreement and close to 
near perfect for Krippendorff’s (2004) alpha. As summarized in Table C.1 in 
Online Appendix C, 176 frames were coded in the analyzed newspaper arti-
cles. These 176 frames were used by 167 actors, so roughly 28% of the actors 
active on the issue in the media voiced an emphasis frame as captured in our 
coding scheme.
From this framing data at the quote level, we created a binary variable 
for each actor in the sample capturing whether any of the emphasis frames 
were voiced while promoting a policy position—in favor or against policy 
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change—on the issue. This variable on the use of individual emphasis frame 
measures whether the advocate voiced any frame on the issue in the media 
(1) or not (0).8
Regarding the camp-level frames, we aggregated the frequency of use of 
individual emphasis frames (at the statement level) for each frame type by all 
actors with the same position (in favor or against policy change). From this 
we created, first, a binary variable on the use of camp emphasis frame indicat-
ing whether the actor’s camp promoted any of the five emphasis frames (1) 
or none (0).
Second, we computed the unity of framing by the camp in terms of a 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of the use of the five emphasis frames. 
The HHI was originally used as a measure of market concentration but has, 
for instance, been used to measure bias in the types of interest groups repre-
sented (Rasmussen & Carroll, 2013, p. 453). In the case of framing, the HHI 
can be applied to measure the concentration of frames by a camp in the five 
categories of emphasis frames. To derive it, the share of emphasis frames by 
camp members in each category out of all frames by the camp is computed 
and the squares of these shares are summed. The most diverse frame use by a 
camp (with equal shares of frames in all five categories) would approach 0.2 
(1/5), whereas the most homogeneous frames use in a camp would have a 
HHI of 1. In addition, where no emphasis framing was used by an actor’s 
camp, the HHI was set to 0, so in the full sample, the Unity of Camp Framing 
(HHI) ranges from 0 (no emphasis framing voice) to 1 (i.e., all actors in the 
camp use the same emphasis frame).9
Third, to assess the effects of dominant emphasis frames, meaning the 
substantial priority most often emphasized by the actor’s camp, we identified 
the emphasis frame in each camp that displayed the highest frequency of use 
by the camp. Looking at dominance relative to the other frames ensures that 
the central mechanism of collective framing is captured: To potentially affect 
how an issue is understood by policy makers and in the public, it should mat-
ter not just whether any frame is used, but whether a frame trumps other 
frames, and prevails as the frame associated with the position of the camp. 
For the frequency of use of the dominant frame by a camp, we used the log of 
the number of times the most frequently used frame was promoted by the 
camp. This supports an expectation that while higher frequency of use should 
stimulate preference attainment, we would expect decreasing returns as the 
number of frames increase. The Frequency of Dominant Camp Frame (log) 
ranges from 0 to 3.71.10
Finally, we include the variable Convergence Camp–Issue Frame indicat-
ing congruence between the dominant camp and issue-level frames. The lat-
ter is constructed by first identifying which of the emphasis frames was 
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promoted on the issue most frequently by both camps and then relating this 
dominant issue frame to the most frequently used frame by the actor’s camp. 
Where two or more frames have the same frequency of use, this was captured 
separately, both for the camp and issue level, and treated as a sixth type of 
multiple competing dominant frames.11 The variable Convergence Camp–
Issue Frame then compares the camp-level dominant frame with this domi-
nant issue frame: where a different emphasis frame type is dominant in the 
advocate’s camp than at the issue level, there is non-congruence (0), and 
where the two camps voice different dominant emphasis frames and the 
advocate’s camp has the same dominant frame as at the issue level, there is 
congruence (1). In the remaining cases, both camps have the same dominant 
frame on the issue and no camp has won the framing battle (2).
Table C.4 in the online appendix shows summary statistics of all indepen-
dent variables, as well as controls.
Control Variables
Our models include a series of control variables. First, actor type may affect 
both frame use (Klüver et al., 2015) and lobbying success (e.g., Binderkrantz 
& Rasmussen, 2015; Dür, Bernhagen, & Marshall, 2015; Rasmussen et al., 
2018). We distinguish four groups of lobbying advocates, namely (a) interest 
associations representing public interest groups, identity, and hobby organi-
zations (noneconomic interests); (b) organizations representing economic 
interests, namely business and occupational associations and firms; (c) trade 
unions who can be seen as fostering both economic and noneconomic goals; 
and (d) institutional associations and experts.12 It is important to note that 
media access may vary for different group types (Binderkrantz, 2012), and 
given our issue-centered sampling of actors, we only capture groups that 
have successfully entered the media arena. Yet, as Table C.3 in Online 
Appendix C summarizes, all four actor types are active in the coded media, 
with business actors being the largest of the four groups, although often 
expected to prefer insider strategies (Dür & Mateo, 2013). Moreover, for all 
four actor types, considerable shares of actors use emphasis framing when 
advocating their positions in the media, namely ranging between 20.3% 
(Experts and Institutional Associations) and 34.6% (Trade Unions). And 
interestingly, all coded emphasis frames are used by economic and noneco-
nomic actor types, so frame use does not seem to be strictly endogenous to 
the underlying interests represented (cf. De Bruycker, 2017, p. 4).
Second, we control for the level of activity of the actor in the media debate 
by including the number of positional statements an actor made on an issue 
in the observation period. Because of a skewed distribution with a few 
498 Comparative Political Studies 52(4)
outliers experiencing high degrees of activity, we used the log of this total 
count of positional statements. This measure controls for the alternative 
explanation that it is just intensity of media lobbying rather than content of 
frames that matters.13 Third, to avoid a status quo bias affecting the analysis, 
we introduce a binary variable to capture whether or not the actor favors 
policy change or the status quo (Baumgartner et al., 2009). Fourth, we control 
for the share of actors on the issue in the advocate’s positional camp, which 
might be a source of bargaining leverage for an advocate (Baumgartner et al., 
2009; Klüver, 2013; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2015). Media salience of the 
issue is, fifth, included as a control, as it affects lobbying strategies (Junk, 
2016) and expectably the numbers and types of frames voiced, as well as the 
likelihood of success for the single advocate (cf. Mahoney, 2007). Media 
salience equals the average number of articles on the issue per day over the 
duration of our observation period. Finally, fixed effects for countries control 
for unobserved heterogeneity between the five countries in our sample.
Analysis
We examine the impact of framing on preference attainment in a series of 
multilevel, logistic regressions with random intercepts for policy issues 
because preference attainment is likely to be affected by the issue on which 
an actor is active.14 Models 1 and 2 assess the effect of the use of emphasis 
frames by individual advocates and by their positional camp in the media in 
the full sample of 604 advocates active on the 50 issues. Both individual and 
camp use of emphasis framing are compared with the baseline of using none 
of the coded emphasis frames. Models 3 to 6 explore the ways in which camp 
frames work to affect lobbying success, by assessing the subset of all obser-
vations where the actor’s camp promoted emphasis frames in the media (n = 
510 advocates active on 44 issues). They test variation in the unity, relative 
frequency, and issue congruence of the promoted camp frames while alleviat-
ing potential multicollinearity problems between these camp-level framing 
variables in the full sample.15 Model 7 goes back to the full sample to test 
whether the relationships traced in the subsample also hold in the full sample 
when controlling for whether the camp uses any emphasis frames.
As expected, we find no evidence in Table 1 that emphasis framing of 
policy priorities at the individual level affects the likelihood of preference 
attainment. Model 1 shows that whether or not an individual advocate frames 
her position in terms of one of the five emphasis frames in the media has no 
significant effect on her lobbying success. This effect remains insignificant 
when we add the effect of camp emphasis framing in Models 2 to 7. As 
expected in H1, these models show that it matters for the success of the 
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individual advocate, whether her positional camp promotes an emphasis 
frame in the media. Calculated based on Model 2, an advocate whose camp 
does not promote the coded emphasis frames in the media has a predicted 
probability of lobbying success of 43% whereas predicted success increases 
to 57% for an advocate whose camp promotes emphasis frames in the 
media.16
Models 2 to 6 assess for the subset of all observations where there was a 
camp emphasis frame, which characteristics make it more effective, thus test-
ing H2 to H4. Given that the frequency of use of the dominant frame, frame 
homogeneity, and camp-issue congruence are not unrelated, the relationships 
are first tested individually, and then jointly, to show to what extent coeffi-
cient estimates stay stable. In these regressions, we find strong support for H2 
that the unity of camp framing is positively associated with lobbying success 
of the advocate, as the effect holds both on its own (Model 3) and in combina-
tion with these other independent variables (Model 6) in the reduced sample. 
Calculated based on Model 6, as the Unity of Camp Emphasis Framing 
moves from its observed minimum in the subsample (Unity = 0.375) to its 
observed maximum (Unity = 1), predicted success of the advocate in the 
camp moves from 26% to 60%. A consistent framing message by the camp 
can thus have a substantial and highly significant (p < .001 in Model 6) effect 
on preference attainment for individual advocates.
However, in contrast to the expectation in H3, the frequency of use of the 
camp’s dominant frame does not have a significant positive effect. Model 4 
suggests that there is no significant effect of the frequency of use of the 
camp’s dominant frame, whereas Model 6 even suggests that it has a signifi-
cant negative effect (p < .001). Model 6 might thus indicate that higher fram-
ing volume can even be a sign of trouble when holding frame unity and issue 
dominance vis-á-vis the other camp constant. Surely, the results do not give 
any evidence that higher dominant frame frequency by the actor’s camp is 
beneficial for lobbying success in itself, so H3 is not supported.
In contrast, both Models 5 and 6 provide support for H4: It matters for 
lobbying success whether the camp’s emphasis frame comes to dominate the 
issue vis-á-vis the opposing camp. Where there is camp-issue convergence, 
compared with nonconvergence, actors in the camp are significantly more 
likely to attain their policy preferences. In Model 5, this effect is very highly 
significant (p < .001), whereas significance drops somewhat with the addi-
tion of the other framing variables (p = .073 in Model 6). Estimated based on 
Model 6, the predicted probability of preference attainment for an actor 
increases from 39% to 51% where the camp-level frame comes to dominate 
the issue vis-à-vis the opposing frame, compared with a scenario where a dif-
ferent frame dominates the issue. Where both camps promote the same 
502 Comparative Political Studies 52(4)
dominant frame, the predicted probability of success is not significantly dif-
ferent from the baseline of nonconvergence between camp and issue frame.
After having examined our hypotheses in the subset of all observations 
where the actor’s camp promoted emphasis frames in the media, Model 7 
tests the robustness of the findings in the full sample. Given high correlations 
between some predictors in this model, its coefficients need to be interpreted 
with greater care and are only meaningful when assessed jointly with Models 
3 to 6 on the subsample. Importantly, this testing on the full sample supports 
H2 and H4, as well: Framing in unity and winning the framing of the issue in 
competition with the opposing camp makes lobbying success significantly 
more likely (both at p < .05). The frequency of use of the dominant frame has 
no significant effect, so H3 is again not supported. Finally, the effect of the 
mere presence of camp framing in Model 7 has no positive effect anymore as 
in Model 2, but now has a negative effect (p < .05). Yet, given the discussed 
relatively high correlations between this variable and the camp framing char-
acteristics in the full sample, this shift could be due to multicollinearity. What 
the presented analyses in Models 3 to 7 clearly add to Model 2 is that the 
precise characteristics of camp framing—in addition to its mere occurrence—
are crucial for understanding lobbying success of individual actors.
Comparing the Akaike information criterion (AIC) on model fit across 
Models 1, 2, and 7 (with the same n = 604) in fact indicates that both the 
addition of the use of emphasis framing by the actor’s camp as a binary 
variable and the addition of camp framing characteristics of unity, relative 
frequency, and camp-issue congruence increase model fit (decreasing the 
AIC). In sum, these models suggest that there are important collective 
dynamics at the level of lobbying camps at work when it comes to framing 
issues in the media.
Turning to the control variables in the discussed models, we see a sig-
nificant difference in predicted preference attainment between some of the 
actor types: Business, Occupational Associations, and Firms, as well as 
Trade Unions are significantly less likely to attain their preference than 
Hobby, Identity, and Public Interest Groups (p < .05 or below). This is in 
contrast to frequent discussions of a business bias (Schlozman, 1984), but 
in line with recent evidence by Dür et al. (2015) on EU lobbying who find 
that business actors are often at a disadvantage compared with citizen inter-
ests. As expected, actors lobbying for change are less likely to be successful 
than when they aim at preserving the status quo in all the models (p < .001). 
So while status quo challengers might have more access to the media (De 
Bruycker & Beyers, 2015), actually changing the status quo remains hard 
for active advocates. Also as expected, the predicted probability of success 
significantly increases (at p < .001) as the relative size of an actor’s camp 
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increases. This is in line with earlier findings by Klüver (2013) and 
Mahoney and Baumgartner (2015). What the results of our analysis add to 
this is that, holding the relative size of the camp constant, the framing by an 
actor’s camp has an additional effect on the individual likelihood of prefer-
ence attainment. Media salience only influences preference attainment in 
four of the seven models (at p < .1 or below) and has a positive rather than 
the negative effect sometimes expected in the literature (Mahoney, 2007). 
Finally, preference attainment varies little by country with the exception of 
Sweden displaying higher levels of preference attainment in three models 
(p < .1 or below).
Robustness and Additional Explanation
The above findings add considerably to our understanding of how framing 
efforts of individual advocates play out via the camp level and through the 
struggle between camps to dominate issue definition. They are also robust to 
using different model specifications and operationalizations.
First, our findings on the lack of an effect of individual frames are robust 
to a number of different operationalizations, namely in terms of the absolute 
or relative frequency of individual framing, as well as to including the spe-
cific type of emphasis frame (such as Environment, Economy, Safety) pro-
moted by the individual advocate. According to Online Appendix E, none of 
these different operationalizations (Models E1-E3) reveal a significant effect 
of individual framing. Furthermore, while we found a significant effect when 
the dominant camp frame is consistent with the dominant issue frame, there 
is no similar effect for individually voiced frames. Individual advocates 
whose frame also dominates the issue do not experience higher preference 
attainment (Model E4). Neither does it matter whether the individual domi-
nant frame is congruent with the advocate’s camp (Model E5). So, while our 
results strongly suggest that frame coordination between advocates is impor-
tant for lobbying success, it does not seem to be enough for an actor to simply 
promote the most popular emphasis frame voiced by her lobbying camp. As 
we showed, it rather matters how the emphasis frames by all actors in the 
camp come together, so the promotion of frames becomes a complex strate-
gic game where the choices of all actors in the camp should be interdependent 
to maximize the likelihood of preference attainment.
Second, we explored whether the interdependence between advocates in a 
camp—in terms of them being a community of fate that either loses or wins 
together—which is also at heart of our theoretical argument, biases the statis-
tical results. While the multilevel models presented account for the nesting of 
advocates in issues, it does not consider nesting in camps. Due to the lack of 
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variation in the dependent variable of binary advocacy success, it is not pos-
sible to add a third-camp level or to use clustered standard errors at the camp 
level. Yet, to attend to this valid concern of interdependence between advo-
cates in the same (and opposing) camps, Table F.1 in the online appendix 
accounts for spatial autocorrelation, that is, interdependence of advocates in 
and between camps by way of spatial filtering (Tiefelsdorf & Griffith, 
2007).17 To do so, principal components estimated based on a matrix of camp 
membership of all actors on each issue are included as controls to absorb the 
variation that stems from the interdependence of outcomes for actors in and 
across camps. Importantly, our main findings are robust to this: Even when 
including the principal components in the analysis, framing by the camp of an 
actor (as a binary variable) has a significant positive effect on that actor’s 
preference attainment (p < .05 in Model F2). Moreover, in these regressions, 
we also find a highly significant positive effect of emphasis frame unity in the 
camp (p < .01 or below in Models F3, F6, and F718) and of the convergence 
of issue and camp frame on preference attainment (p < .001 in Models F5, F6, 
and F7).
Third, alternative operationalizations of frame unity and frequency of 
dominant frames by the camp keep our results intact, as Table D.1 in Online 
Appendix D shows. Where unity is measured as the share of all emphasis 
frames voiced by the actor’s camp that are the dominant frame (rather than 
the HHI), unity still has an effect of similar size and significance (p < .001) 
in the full and limited sample. Similarly, where frequency is measured rela-
tively in terms of how often the actor’s camp promoted the dominant frame 
relative to all frames by both camps on the issue, there is still no, or a nega-
tive, effect of the relative frequency of dominant frame use by the camp.19 
The effect of camp-issue congruence is robust to using these alternative oper-
ationalization, as well (p < .01).
Finally, we tentatively test a further explanation in addition to framing 
unity by the camp and competitive processes of camp-issue congruence, 
namely the effect of the type of dominant emphasis frame by the actor’s 
camp. An actor’s lobbying success may depend on which particular emphasis 
frame (such as a dominant Safety, Rights, Economy,  Environment or Culture 
frame) is prominently connected to the desired policy position through the 
camp’s framing efforts. Table G.1 in the online appendix indicates that there 
are, in fact, differences in how appealing the different dominant camp frames 
are, with dominant Economy and Environment emphasis frames at camp 
level being associated with significantly higher preference attainment (at p < 
.001) than the baseline of none of these emphasis camp frames promoted by 
the camp. In contrast, a dominant Rights frame at camp level as well as being 
in a camp that equally frequently promotes multiple competing frames rather 
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than one dominant emphasis frame are associated with significantly lower 
preference attainment than this baseline (at p < .05 and p < .01, respectively). 
However, to what extent these differences between the more and less suc-
cessful emphasis frames are generalizable across issues outside the sample of 
50 issues assessed in this article is not certain. There might, for instance, be 
interactions with sets of policy areas that reward certain of the emphasis 
frames more than others. On the contrary, one might argue that the perception 
of what are the most fitting policy areas an issue falls under is at least partly 
affected by collective framing processes (cf. Daviter, 2011, p. 19). For these 
reasons, it is harder to draw generalizable conclusions on the appeal of spe-
cific types of emphasis frames, such as Economy versus Safety, across issues 
and policy areas.
In contrast, the framing characteristics analyzed in this article, namely the 
promotion of any emphasis frame by the camp in the media, framing unity, 
dominant frame frequency, and camp-issue congruence, should have broader 
applicability, because there is no reason to think that emphasis frames should 
work in these ways only in some policy areas. Moreover, the random inter-
cepts for the 50 diverse issues assessed in the article control for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the political situation that might affect the success of camp 
frames.
Conclusion
Whether and how framing affects who prevails in political discussions is cen-
tral to understanding some of the core questions of “who gets what, when, 
how” (Lasswell, 1950) in politics. Advocates lobbying for or against policy 
change on an issue try to frame it in a way to bring about favored outcomes, 
yet existing studies show that these individual frames are typically ineffective 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Mahoney, 2008). Nonetheless, as this article has 
shown, this does not mean that framing is insignificant for understanding 
advocacy success. On the contrary, according to our results, emphasis fram-
ing is highly significant for the success of advocacy efforts, yet it is collective 
framing at the camp level that matters rather than individual framing.
Based on existing qualitative work on framing, this article has formulated 
a theory on the mechanisms that underlie framing effects on advocacy success 
that links individual framing efforts by advocates to collective forces of issue 
definition. We hypothesized that emphasis framing by the advocate’s camp is 
more likely to increase the likelihood for the actor to succeed than individual 
framing (H1) and that it matters how much the camp of an actor frames the 
issue in unity (H1), with what frequency it promotes its dominant frame (H3), 
and, finally, whether the frame dominantly promoted by the camp also comes 
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to dominate the issue vis-à-vis the opposing camp (H4). By analyzing the 
promotion of five generic emphasis frames across a large number of diverse 
policy issues in the media arena, we presented strong support for three of these 
hypotheses: Indeed, advocacy success of individual actors is crucially affected 
not by whether they themselves manage to attach an emphasis frame to their 
advocated policy position in the media, but by the collective framing efforts of 
the camp of actors lobbying for the same policy outcome as them. Furthermore, 
we showed that it matters for the individual advocate to what extent her camp 
frames the issue consistently with one voice, and whether the camp wins the 
struggle of defining the issue in relation to the opposing camp. In contrast, the 
frequency with which the camp promotes its dominant emphasis frame has no 
positive effect on actor’s preference attainment.
We have thus provided clear evidence that not just lobbying in general, but 
framing, in particular, is “a collective enterprise” (Klüver, 2013) in which the 
efforts of like-minded groups matter. We demonstrate that advocates are 
dependent, not only on the strength of the groups lobbying on the same side 
(Klüver, 2013; Mahoney & Baumgartner, 2015) but also on how like-minded 
groups communicate about the issue and whether this framing comes to pre-
vail over the opposing camp. Importantly, this means that strategic framing 
by advocates must go beyond an actor’s own communication, but include a 
strategy to collectively voice frames with other like-minded groups. Camp-
level framing by the opposing positional sides on an issue is thus a relevant 
link between the individual and aggregate level of framing on policy issues 
that helps us understand how policy outcomes on an issue are collectively 
shaped by advocates. Yet, while camp size and camp resources may follow a 
simple logic of the more the merrier, camp-level framing is more complex in 
its effects, as we have shown. It seems to be camp unity and issue dominance 
rather than framing quantity that matters for lobbying success. So, in the 
example of nuclear power we started out with, the consistency of the framing 
“story” and the success of frames promoted by the pro or antinuclear lobby in 
dominating the issue debate in different countries may, according to our 
results, be a part in the puzzle of understanding varying policy outcomes and 
advocacy success across countries.
In interpreting these results, it needs to be acknowledged that we worked 
with a strict definition and operationalization of preference attainment as a 
binary variable, which was enabled by a selection of issues from opinion 
polls that align in terms of binary outcomes. Consequently, we measure 
“hard” success in terms of a predefined policy result, thus arguably putting 
the effects of framing to a hard test. Yet, it is also conceivable that framing 
works to achieve smaller successes in the desired policy direction, say for 
instance, side-deals or exceptions to general legislation, albeit an undesired 
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policy passes. In this sense, our measure is likely to underestimate “softer” 
framing successes, and results should be read in these “hard” terms.
Moreover, as Boräng et al. (2014) show, analyzing the same data with dif-
ferent methods to capture frames can affect the number of frames identified, 
especially depending on the level of abstraction in the frames, so results need 
to be interpreted relative to the respective mode of coding and aggregation. 
We chose an empirical strategy of capturing five generic emphasis frames 
that have broad applicability across policy issues, and our analysis tapped 
into the ways of how the collective use of these emphasis frames at the camp 
level is related to lobbying success. There is certainly scope for extending our 
approach to consider additional types of frames, and the relationship between 
framing and advocacy success in venues beyond the media. Still, given our 
quasi-random sampling of 50 diverse issues in five countries and our focus 
on the characteristics of collective emphasis framing (rather than on differ-
ences between exact frames), our conclusions can hopefully inform more 
generally about relationships between advocacy success and collective 
emphasis framing. Based on these findings, future research could, for 
instance, assess more closely how the dominant frames of competing camps 
interact, as well as address how active cooperation between like-minded 
advocacy groups potentially helps them succeed by coordinating a framing 
strategy. Our theory and findings underline the importance of expanding 
research of collective framing at the level of advocacy camps.
Appendix
Selection of Frames
Any capturing of frames aggregates complex social narratives, and there is no 
single right level of simplification and aggregation (Boräng et al., 2014). We 
opted for a level of abstraction that is sufficiently general to facilitate compari-
son across a large number of policy issues from different policy areas. After 
consulting existing work on generic frames in lobbying research (Klüver, 
Mahoney, & Opper, 2015; Mahoney, 2008) and broader coding schemes in the 
analysis of claims making (de Wilde, Koopmans, & Zürn, 2014), we selected a 
total of five priority frames, which capture prominent priorities voiced by advo-
cates. These are as follows:
•• SAFETY refers to the integrity of persons, states, or other bodies from 
threats like violence, or risks to public or consumer health.
•• RIGHTS captures the protection or promotion of human or other rights 
or alleviation of human suffering.
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•• ECONOMY is about fostering wealth, prosperity, and economic 
growth or avoiding facing adverse economic effects.
•• ENVIRONMENT captures conserving the environment or protecting 
the climate.
•• CULTURE refers to conserving traditions, values, and cultural heritage.
The first four categories overlap with existing schemes (Klüver et al., 2015), 
while we added Culture against the background of potentially increasing cul-
tural conservatism in European countries.
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Notes
 1. We define advocates as all interest groups (including business and occupational 
associations, trade unions, public, identity, and hobby organizations), as well as 
firms, institutional organizations, and experts, actively and publicly promoting a 
policy position on an issue.
 2. Namely, Politiken in Denmark, German Süddeutsche Zeitung, The Guardian in 
the United Kingdon, Dagens Nyheter in Sweden, and the Dutch de Volkskrant.
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 3. Denmark: Politiken and Jyllands-Posten, Germany: Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
Frankfurther Allgemeine Zeitung, the Netherlands: De Volkskrant and NRC 
Handelsblad, Sweden: Dagens Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet; and the United 
Kingdom: The Guardian and The Telegraph.
 4. Available at http://govlis.eu/codebooks-and-data/.
 5. Coders were instructed to identify additional priorities at stake outside these cate-
gories and raise these in supervision, yet this did not result in additional generic cat-
egories, because the five categories had a wide coverage regarding the arguments.
 6. Available at http://govlis.eu/codebooks-and-data/.
 7. These were selected from the U.K. material in a way to ensure that the selected 
quotes covered a diversity of frames.
 8. In addition, robustness checks using alternative operationalizations of individual 
framing are presented in Online Appendix E.
 9. An alternative operationalization of frame unity as the share of all frames pro-
moted by the camp that are of the dominant camp frame type is tested in Online 
Appendix D.
10. An alternative relative measure of frequency in terms of how often the actor’s 
camp promoted its dominant frame relative to all frames on the issue by both 
camps is tested in Online Appendix D.
11. Table C.2 in the online appendix summarizes how the dominant frames at camp 
and issue level are distributed across advocates and issues.
12. Experts are organizations or public figures in the possession of specialized 
knowledge (Schudson, 2006, p. 499) and included as advocates where they 
expressed an explicit position on the specific issue in the media.
13. Note that actor activity is only mildly correlated with the presence of framing (r 
= .25) and removing this control does not change the findings indicating that the 
effects of actor activity and emphasis framing can be distinguished.
14. The likelihood ratio statistic provides strong evidence that between issue vari-
ance is different from zero.
15. H2 to H4 are first tested on the reduced sample, as in the full sample, there are 
two high correlations of r > |.6| between the variables of interest, namely the 
occurrence (binary) and the unity and frequency of camp framing (see Table C.5 
in the Online Appendix C). This is the case because for all observations without 
camp framing in the full sample, these characteristics are perfectly correlated. 
In contrast, in the reduced sample, all pairwise correlations between different 
variables lie well below the threshold of |0.6| commonly taken as indicative of 
multicollinearity problems (see Table C.6 in the online appendix). Additional 
multicollinearity tests calculating the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for our 
predictors in Models 6 and 7 based on an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
demonstrate the same pattern of strongly alleviating potential multicollinearity 
in the reduced sample: The highest calculated VIFs in the full sample lies at 5.54, 
whereas it is 3.04 in the reduced sample.
16. In the calculation of margins in this and subsequent estimates, the other variables 
are held constant at their observed values.
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17. Such an approach has, for example, been used to account for spatial dependence 
in patent citation data in Europe (Fischer & Griffith, 2008).
18. Models F6 and F7 were estimated in multilevel linear models, instead of multilevel 
logistic models. While the predicted coefficients naturally differ, the linear model 
is both unbiased and consistent with a binary dependent variable (Beck, 2015; 
Wooldridge, 2013), and is a useful alternative in nested data structures where logis-
tic regression can face problems. Whereas the logit model is asymptotically more 
efficient, average effects predicted in the linear model are still informative.
19. Note, however, that this measure of relative frequency is more highly correlated 
with other camp characteristics, such as convergence of camp and issue frame. 
Therefore, the absolute (logged) measure presented in the main analysis is more 
suited to separate out the effects of frequency of framing, issue dominance, and 
framing unity in a camp.
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